Extending Coggia-Couvreur Attack on Loidreau's Rank-metric Cryptosystem by Ghatak, Anirban
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
07
35
4v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
4 J
ul 
20
20
Submission under review
()
Extending Coggia-Couvreur Attack on Loidreau’s
Rank-metric Cryptosystem
Anirban Ghatak
Abstract A recent paper by Coggia and Couvreur presents a polynomial time
key-recovery attack on Loidreau’s encryption scheme, based on rank-metric codes,
for some parameters. Their attack was formulated for the particular case when the
secret matrix in Loidreau’s scheme is restricted to a 2-dimensional subspace. We
present an extension of the Coggia-Couvreur attack to deal with secret matrices
chosen over subspaces of dimension greater than 2.
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1 Introduction
One of the directions of current research in code-based cryptography is to formu-
late a strong variant of the McEliece scheme [8] using codes in the rank-metric.
The majority of proposals for rank-metric cryptosystems have been based on the
use of Gabidulin codes [3] and their variants [10] or low-rank parity check (LRPC)
codes [4]. Of these, most of the Gabidulin-code based cryptosystems have been
subjected to successful key-recovery attacks, for instance, R. Overbeck’s attack
[9] on the Gabidulin-Paramonov-Tretjakov (GPT) proposal ([3]). The basis of
Overbeck’s attack is the fact that the application of a Frobenius-type map on
a Gabidulin code generator matrix can be used to distinguish it from a random
matrix. This principle - referred to in literature as a “distinguisher” - has since
been used repeatedly to mount successful key recovery attacks on repair proposals
on the GPT and other rank-metric variants; for instance, the attack on Faure-
Loidreau’s scheme [2] by Gaborit et al. [5].
It follows that the first design objective of any rank-metric cryptosystem, based
on Gabidulin-type codes, is resistance to key recovery attack along the lines of
Overbeck’s method. So far, a few recent proposals claim to have achieved that
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- for example, the repair of the Faure-Loidreau rank-metric scheme by Wachter-
Zeh et al. [12] and Loidreau’s scheme [7]. Loidreau’s scheme uses Gabidulin codes
for encryption with the following additional feature. It uses a secret matrix with
entries from a strict subspace of the field underlying the Gabidulin code. It is
claimed that Overbeck’s Frobenius-map distinguisher fails if the Gabidulin gener-
ator matrix is modified with this secret matrix. Coggia and Couvreur have shown
([1]) that polynomial time key recovery is possible with Loidreau’s scheme, for
certain parameter constraints, when the dimension of the secret subspace is pre-
cisely λ = 2. While the dimension constraint appears restrictive, their approach
has opened up the possibility for cryptanalysis of rank-metric schemes which have
claimed resistance to attacks using Overbeck-type distinguishers. In this article
we extend the Coggia-Couvreur key-recovery attack on Loidreau’s cryptosystem
to admit secret matrices over subspaces of dimension λ = 3.
Contributions:
1. A proof of the non-random nature of the public generator matrix (i.e. formu-
lating a “distinguisher” as in [1]) in Loidreau’s scheme for λ ≥ 3.
2. Completing the key-recovery attack for λ = 3.
Organization of the article: The first section outlines Loidreau’s scheme and
describes the steps of the Coggia-Couvreur attack. Section 3 formulates the distin-
guisher for any dimension of the secret subspace. The next section (Section 4) deals
with the computation of certain specific subspaces, which are subsequently used
in the extraction of parameters. Finally Section 5 provides the details of extending
the key recovery attack to the case of λ = 3. We conclude with a discussion on the
results and future work.
2 Loidreau’s Scheme and Coggia-Couvreur Attack
We first outline Loidreau’s scheme and discuss the reason it is claimed to resist
Overbeck’s distinguisher.
2.1 Outline of Loidreau’s scheme:
Loidreau’s scheme ([7]) is similar to the Gabidulin rank-metric scheme, modified
to resist Overbeck’s distinguisher.
– G generator matrix of a Gabidulin code Gk(a) over Fqm ; rkq(a) = n.
– V ⊂ Fqm , dimq(V) = λ ≤ m; P ∈ GLn(q
m) is a matrix over V .
– Define Gp := GP
−1 and t := ⌊n−k2λ ⌋.
– The public key is Kp := (Gp, t) and the secret key, Ks := (a,P).
– Encryption: c =mGp + e; e ∈ F
n
qm and rkq(e) = t.
– Decryption: cP =mG+ eP.
The Fq-dimension of the product space supp(e).V is tλ ≤ ⌊
n−k
2 ⌋, and hence,
decoding for Gk(a) will extract plaintext m.
Overbeck’s attack relies on the “Frobenius map” distinguisher on a Gabidulin code
structure of the public generator matrix. Raising elements of Gp to successive q-
powers and vertically stacking the rows results in an augmented matrix where the
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increase of rank is only by unity at each stage. But the rank of such a matrix
constructed from a random code matrix would have an increment equal to the
rank of the code matrix at every stage with high probability. So the Gabidulin
type code matrix will have markedly less rank at some stage of the augmentation.
However, in Loidreau’s scheme, Gp = GP
−1, where P is constrained to some
subspace V ⊂ Fqm . But there is no control over the entries of P
−1 and so, the
rank increment achieved at each stage via the q-exponentiation map is no longer
exactly unity. Hence Overbeck’s distinguisher is no longer effective.
2.2 Coggia-Couvreur Attack for λ = 2
Coggia and Couvreur defined a distinguisher for Loidreau’s scheme when the secret
subspace V has dimension λ = 2. In this particular case they showed that key
recovery is possible by solving for a triple (γ,g,h) over Fqm , where γ specifies the
secret subspace and g,h specify a decomposition of the (dual) public generator
matrix C⊥pub in terms of the secret matrix P and the secret generator matrix.
Notation: Henceforth in the article, the notation g[i], i an integer, would mean
raising all components of g to the qi-th power.
2.2.1 Distinguisher for λ = 2
– Without loss of generality can specify the secret subspace as:
V = 〈(1, γ)〉;γ ∈ Fqm \ Fq
Then we have the formulation: PT = P0 + γP1, where P0,P1 ∈ GLn(Fq).
– The dual of the secret code has generator matrix: C⊥pub = Gn−k(a
′) for some
a′ ∈ Fnqm with rkq(a
′) = n.
– Define g := a′P0 and h := a
′P1.
– C⊥pub = 〈g+ γh,g
[1] + γh[1], · · · ,g[r] + γh[r]〉, where r := n− k − 1.
Theorem 1 ([1])
dimqm(C
⊥
pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
) ≤ 2 dimqm C
⊥
pub + 2.
It follows that C⊥pub will be distinguishable from a random matrix in polynomial
time whenever 2(n− k)+2 < n, i.e. when n < 2k− 2. Hence, for the distinguisher
to work, the rate of the code should satisfy: k/n > 1/2 + 1/n ≈ 1/2.
2.2.2 Recovery of alternate key
– The following iterated intersection is shown to be of Fqm -dimension 2 and is
generated by g[r] + γ[r]h[r] and g[r+1] + γ[1]h[r+1]:
(C⊥pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
) ∩ (C⊥pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
) ∩ · · · ∩ (C⊥pub
[r]
+ C⊥pub
[r+1]
)
– Can extract the subspaces: 〈g+ γh〉, 〈g + γ[−1]h〉, ..., 〈g + γ[−r]h〉.
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Lemma 1 ([1]) For i, j ∈ {1, · · · , r}, i 6= j, there exists a unique pair
(uij,vij) ∈ 〈g + γ
[−i]h〉 × 〈g+ γ[−j]h〉
such that uij + vij = g + γh.
– The previous lemma leads to expressing uij ,vij in terms of γ,g,h as follows:
uij =
γ[−j] − γ
γ[−j] − γ[−i]
(g+ γ[−i]h); vij =
γ[−i] − γ
γ[−i] − γ[−j]
(g + γ[−j]h).
– Hence for some αj1j2 ∈ Fqm , αj1j2 a function of γ, we get: uij1 = αj1j2uij2 , as
both are Fqm -multiples of g + γ
[−i]h.
– Having computed such an α for a specific pair of uij ’s, viz. u12,u13, one obtains
a polynomial Pγ(X), with γ as a root, of the following form.
Pγ(X) =
Qγ(X)
(Xq−X)q+1
, where
Qγ(X) = (X
q3 −Xq)(Xq
2
−X)− αq
3
(Xq
3
−X)(Xq
2
−Xq)
.
– A crucial result (Proposition 5. [1]) shows that, viewed as vectors over Fq, the
set of roots of Pγ(X) form an orbit under the action of the projective linear
group PGL(2, q). The action is sharply transitive and as such, any root of
Pγ(X) can be chosen as a valid γ.
– With a valid choice for γ, say γ′, and using the known quantities g + γh and
say, u12, set up the equations:
g + γh = g′ + γ′h′; u12 =
γ′
[−2]
− γ′
γ′[−2] − γ′[−1]
(g′ + γ′
[−1]
h′).
Solving for the triple (γ′,g′,h′) provides an alternative secret key.
3 Distinguisher for Loidreau’s Scheme for λ ≥ 3
We attempt to extend Coggia-Couvreur attack to the cases where the secret sub-
space V has dimension λ > 2. The first step is to establish the non-randomness of
the public matrix, i.e. formulating the so-called “distinguisher”.
3.1 Distinguisher for λ = 3.
Assume that V = 〈1, γ1, γ2〉, where γi ∈ Fqm \ Fq.
Accordingly we have: PT = P0 + γ1P1 + γ2P2; where all Pi ∈ GLn(q).
Define g0 = aP0, g1 = aP1, g2 = aP2. Then we have, for r := n− k − 1,
C⊥pub = 〈(g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2), (g
[1]
0 + γ1g
[1]
1 + γ2g
[1]
2 ), · · · , (g
[r]
0 + γ1g
[r]
1 + γ2g
[r]
2 )〉
Likewise C⊥pub
[1]
is spanned by:
(g
[1]
0 +γ
[1]
1 g
[1]
1 +γ
[1]
2 g
[1]
2 ), (g
[2]
0 +γ
[1]
1 g
[2]
1 +γ
[1]
2 g
[2]
2 ), · · · , (g
[r+1]
0 +γ
[1]
1 g
[r+1]
1 +γ
[1]
2 g
[r+1]
2 )
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and C⊥pub
[2]
is spanned by:
(g
[2]
0 +γ
[2]
1 g
[2]
1 +γ
[2]
2 g
[2]
2 ), (g
[3]
0 +γ
[2]
1 g
[3]
1 +γ
[2]
2 g
[3]
2 ), · · · , (g
[r+2]
0 +γ
[2]
1 g
[r+2]
1 +γ
[2]
2 g
[r+2]
2 ).
Hence, akin to the formulation for λ = 2 presented in [1], we state the following
theorem based on the preceding discussion1.
Theorem 2 The dual C⊥pub of the public code in Loidreau’s scheme satisfies:
dimqm(C
⊥
pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
+ C⊥pub
[3]
) ≤ 3 dimqm C
⊥
pub + 3.
Proof Consider the sum space C⊥pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
. For i = 2, · · · , r, given the
choice of γ1, γ2 ∈ Fqm \ Fq, the following matrix is invertible.

1 γ1 γ2
1 γ
[1]
1 γ
[1]
2
1 γ
[2]
1 γ
[2]
2


It follows that one can extract the triples (g
[i]
0 ,g
[i]
1 ,g
[i]
2 ), i = 2, · · · , r, from
(g
[i]
0 + γ1g
[i]
1 + γ2g
[i]
2 ), (g
[i]
0 + γ
[1]
1 g
[i]
1 + γ
[1]
2 g
[i]
2 ) and (g
[i]
0 + γ
[2]
1 g
[i]
1 + γ
[2]
2 g
[i]
2 ).
In addition to these (n − k − 2) triples, C⊥pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
contains the
following 6 vectors:
(g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2), (g
[1]
0 + γ1g
[1]
1 + γ2g
[1]
2 ), (g
[1]
0 + γ
[1]
1 g
[1]
1 + γ
[1]
2 g
[1]
2 )
(g
[r+1]
0 + γ
[1]
1 g
[r+1]
1 + γ
[1]
2 g
[r+1]
2 ), (g
[r+1]
0 + γ
[2]
1 g
[r+1]
1 + γ
[2]
2 g
[r+1]
2 ),
and (g
[r+2]
0 + γ
[2]
1 g
[r+2]
1 + γ
[2]
2 g
[r+2]
2 ).
Thus we can conclude that the sum space C⊥pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
is spanned
by 3(n − k − 2) + 3 + 3 = 3(n − k) vectors as outlined above. Adding C⊥pub
[3]
to
this sum space adds vectors involving terms of q-power 3 and above, going up to
the term having (r + 3)-th power of q.
Evidently this allows the extraction of another triple {g
[r+1]
0 ,g
[r+1]
1 ,g
[r+1]
2 }, adds
two terms with q-power r + 2 and a last term with q-power r + 3.
Therefore,
dimqm(C
⊥
pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
+ C⊥pub
[3]
) ≤ 3(n− k) + 3.
⊓⊔
From the above theorem, we can infer that for λ = 3, C⊥pub is distinguishable
in polynomial time from a random code matrix when 3(n− k) + 3 < n, i.e. when
3k− 3 > 2n. This also implies that this distinguisher is effective if the underlying
codes have rate k
n
> 23 .
1 In a recent version of their paper: arxiv.org/abs/1903.02933v2, the authors have indicated
the form of the sum space to extend their argument for λ = 2. We had independently arrived at
a similar conclusion based on the original version of their paper and have, moreover, presented
the details of the proof for λ ≥ 3.
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3.2 Distinguisher for λ > 3
Based on the principle outlined for λ ≤ 3, one can propose distinguishers for
Loidreau’s scheme, subject to a constraint on the rate k
n
of the underlying code.
For λ = m > 3, it is assumed that the secret subspace V = 〈1, γ1, · · · , γm−1〉,
γi ∈ Fqm \Fq. In the same spirit as before, we first look at the m-fold q-power sum
of C⊥pub, the dual public code, given by:
C⊥pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
+ · · ·+ C⊥pub
[m−1]
. (1)
Grouping together terms involving the same q-powers, we can extract m-tuples
(g
[i]
0 ,g
[i]
1 , · · · ,g
[i]
m−1) whenever we can form an invertible m × m matrix of the
following form: 

1 γ1 · · · γm−1
1 γ
[1]
1 · · · γ
[1]
m−1
...
...
. . .
...
1 γ
[m−1]
1 · · · γ
[m−1]
m−1


Thus, we can count the number of terms in the m-fold sum, prior to the stage that
such an invertible matrix can be formed to extract the first set of m-tuples with
largest q-power m− 1 as follows:
There are precisely m(m−1)2 terms of the form (g
[i]
0 + γ
[j]
1 g
[i]
1 + · · ·+ γ
[j]
m−1g
[i]
m−1),
with both i, j allowed to assume appropriate values between 0 and m− 2.
Next, assuming m < n − k − 1, we can continue to collect m-tuples of higher
q-powers till i = n−k−1. Beyond this, we revert back to the sum vectors involving
higher q-powers all the way up to i = n − k − 1 + (m− 1) = n − k −m − 2 and
this adds another set of (m− 1) + (m− 2) + · · ·+ 1 = m(m−1)2 vectors.
Therefore, we conclude that the m-fold sum in (1) has Fqm-dimension M , where
M ≤ 2×
m(m− 1)
2
+m(n− k − 1− (m− 2)) = m(n− k) = m dimqm(C
⊥
pub).
Adding C⊥pub
[m]
to the sum space in (1) does not change the stage at which the
first m-tuple can be extracted. But it does alter the stage of extracting the fi-
nal m-tuple: we can obtain an invertible m × m matrix to extract the tuple
(g
[n−k]
0 ,g
[n−k]
1 , · · · ,g
[n−k]
m−1 ). Beyond this, there are again a set of
m(m−1)
2 vec-
tors with terms of increasing q-powers till n − k − 1 +m. This yields a total of
m(m− 1) +m(n− k − (m− 2)) = m(n− k) +m vectors.
Hence we have the following
Theorem 3 If the secret subspace of Loidreau’s scheme has dimension given by
λ = m ≥ 2, the dual of the public code, denoted C⊥pub, satisfies:
dimqm(C
⊥
pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
+ · · ·+ C⊥pub
[m]
) ≤ m dimqm C
⊥
pub +m.
Evidently this procedure yields a distinguisher when m(n − k) +m < n. So the
distinguisher is effective when the underlying code has rate k
n
> m−1
m
. This argues
in favour of using low or moderate rate codes in conjunction with secret subspaces
of large dimensions in order to counter this distinguisher.
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4 Computing the extraction subspaces
To extend the Coggia-Couvreur attack to the case λ = 3, we attempt to obtain an
alternative tuple {γ′1, γ
′
2,g
′
0,g
′
1, g
′
2}, which can lead to a valid secret key. Following
the procedure outlined in Section 2 , the first step is to compute the subspace
〈g0,g1,g2〉, and hence, sum spaces of the form 〈g0+γ
[−i]
1 g1+γ
[−i]
2 g2〉, for integers
i > 0. These subspaces, taken together, are then utilized to extract alternative
tuples for a valid secret key - hence we term them extraction subspaces. Further
we term the subspaces formed by adjoining successive q-powers of subspaces as
sumspaces. To obtain the extraction subspaces, we first examine the intersections
for the 3-fold sumspaces.
4.1 Intersections of sumspaces
We now establish the dimensions of intersection spaces among the sumspaces with
different sequences of q-powers of the dual code C⊥pub. For that, we introduce the
following notation to denote sumspaces involving several q-powers. Define
Sij := C
⊥
pub
[j]
+ C⊥pub
[j+1]
+ · · ·+ C⊥pub
[j+i−1]
which starts with qj-th power of C⊥pub and adds i − 1 more terms with increasing
q-powers till C⊥pub
[j+i−1]
. In this notation, we have:
S40 := (C
⊥
pub + C
⊥
pub
[1]
+ C⊥pub
[2]
+ C⊥pub
[3]
).
Hence, we have established in Theorem 2 that:
dimqm(S
4
0) ≤ 3 dimqm C
⊥
pub + 3.
Looking at the spanning sets for the 3-fold sumspaces S30 and S
3
1 , it is evident
that both of them have Fqm-dimensions ≤ 3(n − k). Assuming both the above
sumspaces possess maximum dimension and further, the 4-fold sumspace S40 has
dimension 3(n− k) + 3, we have:
dimqm(S
3
0 ∩ S
3
1 ) = 3(n− k)− 3 (2)
A spanning set for S32 consists of triples {g
[i]
0 , g
[i]
1 , g
[i]
2 } for i = 4, 5, · · · , r+2, along
with the following 6 vectors:
(g
[2]
0 + γ
[2]
1 g
[2]
1 + γ
[2]
1 g
[2]
2 ), (g
[3]
0 + γ
[2]
1 g
[3]
1 + γ
[2]
2 g
[3]
2 ), (g
[3]
0 + γ
[3]
1 g
[3]
1 + γ
[3]
2 g
[3]
2 )
(g
[r+3]
0 + γ
[3]
1 g
[r+3]
1 + γ
[3]
1 g
[r+3]
2 ), (g
[r+3]
0 + γ
[4]
1 g
[r+3]
1 + γ
[4]
2 g
[r+3]
2 ) and finally,
(g
[r+4]
0 + γ
[4]
1 g
[r+4]
1 + γ
[4]
2 g
[r+4]
2 ).
In all, we have 3(r + 2− 3) = 3(n− k − 2) vectors from the triples and the 6
vectors apart from them, spanning S32 . Moreover, we can list the vectors “shared”
between S32 and S
3
0 as follows.
1. All the triples for indices i = 4, · · · , r.
2. The last 3 vectors of S30 belong to the span of the last two triples of S
3
2 .
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3. The first 3 vectors of S32 belong to the span of the first two triples of S
3
0 .
Therefore, the intersection space of the above 3-fold sumspaces has dimension
3(r − 3) + 6. Thus we have:
dimqm(S
3
0 ∩ S
3
2 ) = 3(n− k) − 6. (3)
Theorem 4 The dimension of the intersection space S30∩S
3
m over Fqm is precisely
3(n− k)− 3m .
Proof We prove the theorem by induction on m, the first q-power term of the
second sumspace. By the preceding discussion, the above holds for m = 1, 2.
Assuming it holds upto m− 1, we have
dimqm(S
3
0 ∩ S
3
m−1) = 3(n− k)− 3(m− 1).
Raising the first exponent to m from m − 1 reduces one shared triple from the
intersection space. However, the last three vectors of the first sumspace and the
first three vectors of the second sumspace are still shared. Thus, there is a reduction
of the dimension of the intersection space by precisely 3 in going from m − 1 to
m. Hence
dimqm(S
3
0 ∩ S
3
m) = 3(n− k)− 3m.
⊓⊔
Corollary 1 Given r = n− k − 1, we have:
dimqm(S
3
0 ∩ S
3
r ) = 3(n− k)− 3r = 3. (4)
4.2 Extraction subspaces from intersection between C⊥pub and sumspaces
Building on the previous analysis, we now compute the extraction subspaces from
the intersection of C⊥pub with recursively obtained subspaces.
From Corollary 1, we expect to identify 3 independent vectors which span the
intersection space S30 ∩ S
3
r . Two obvious choices are the vectors:
v1 = g
[r]
0 + γ
[r]
1 g
[r]
1 + γ
[r]
2 g
[r]
2 , v2 = g
[r+2]
0 + γ
[2]
1 g
[r+2]
1 + γ
[2]
2 g
[r+2]
2 .
The choice of a third vector spanning S30∩S
3
r , linearly independent with respect
to the two above, must be from the intersection of the following subspaces:
〈g
[r+1]
0 + γ
[1]
1 g
[r+1]
1 + γ
[1]
2 g
[r+1]
2 , g
[r+1]
0 + γ
[2]
1 g
[r+1]
1 + γ
[2]
2 g
[r+1]
2 〉
and
〈g
[r+1]
0 + γ
[r]
1 g
[r+1]
1 + γ
[r]
2 g
[r+1]
2 , g
[r+1]
0 + γ
[r+1]
1 g
[r+1]
1 + γ
[r+1]
2 g
[r+1]
2 〉.
Thus the third vector can have the following equivalent representations:
v3 = g
[r+1]
0 + (k1γ
[1]
1 + k2γ
[2]
1 )g
[r+1]
1 + (k1γ
[1]
2 + k2γ
[2]
2 )g
[r+1]
2
= g
[r+1]
0 + (m1γ
[r]
1 +m2γ
[r+1]
1 )g
[r+1]
1 + (m1γ
[r]
2 +m2γ
[r+1]
2 )g
[r+1]
2
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where k1, k2,m1,m2 ∈ Fqm . Let
x1 := v
[−r]
1 = g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2;
x2 := v
[−r]
2 = g
[2]
0 + γ
[2−r]
1 g
[2]
1 + γ
[2−r]
2 g
[2]
2 ;
x3 := v
[−r]
3 = g
[1]
0 + (a1γ1 + a2γ
[1]
1 )g
[1]
1 + (a1γ2 + a2γ
[1]
2 )g
[1]
2 .
Define B1 := 〈x1,x2,x3〉. In a manner similar to that outlined in [1], we proceed
to first obtain the subspace 〈g0,g1,g2〉 and then the other extraction subspaces.
– Obtain 〈g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2〉 from the intersection C
⊥
pub ∩ B1.
Raising to the q-th power, we get 〈g
[1]
0 + γ
[1]
1 g
[1]
1 + γ
[1]
2 g
[1]
2 〉.
– Consider the following sum of subspaces:
B2 = B1 + 〈g
[1]
0 + γ
[1]
1 g
[1]
1 + γ
[1]
2 g
[1]
2 〉+
〈g
[1]
0 + (b1γ
[1−r]
1 + b2γ
[2−r]
1 )g
[1]
1 + (a1γ
[1−r]
1 + b2γ
[2−r]
2 )g
[1]
2 〉
where one of the forms of v3 yields the third component.
Evidently B2 = 〈x1, g
[1]
0 ,g
[1]
1 ,g
[1]
2 ,x2〉.
– We can thus extract 〈g
[1]
0 + γ
[−1]
1 g
[1]
1 + γ
[−1]
2 g
[1]
2 〉 from B2 ∩ (C
⊥
pub)
[−1]. Thence
we obtain B3 := 〈g0 + γ
[−2]
1 g1 + γ
[−2]
2 g2〉.
– The following sum of subspaces:
B3 + 〈x1〉+ 〈g0 + (c1γ
[−1]
1 + c2γ1)g1 + (c1γ
[−1]
2 + c2γ2)g2〉
where the third component is obtained from x3, yields B = 〈g0,g1,g2〉. The
i-th extraction subspace 〈g0+γ
[−i]
1 g1+γ
[−i]
2 g2〉 can be obtained by taking the
q−i-th power of the intersection B[i] ∩ C⊥pub.
5 Completing the Attack for λ = 3
Following Coggia and Couvreur ([1]) for the 2-dimensional case, we can specify
the goal of the attack as follows.
Objective:
To extract an alternative tuple {g′0,g
′
1,g
′
2, γ
′
1, γ
′
2} such that it satisfies:
C⊥pub = 〈g
′
0
[i]
+ γ′1g
′
1
[i]
+ γ′2g
′
2
[i]
| i = 0, 1, · · · , n− k − 1〉 (5)
The analogous result was ingeniously achieved in the two-dimensional case by
performing a semilinear transformation on the single parameter γ and setting up
an equation to obtain the g-parameters ((g,h) in [1]). We now show that the same
trick works in the 3-dimensional case as well.
Proposition 1 Define γ′1, γ
′
2 ∈ Fqm \ Fq as follows:
γ1 =
a11γ
′
1 + a12γ
′
2 + a13
a31γ′1 + a32γ
′
2 + a33
; γ2 =
a21γ
′
1 + a22γ
′
2 + a23
a31γ′1 + a32γ
′
2 + a33
.
where aij are the entries of a matrix A ∈ GL3(Fq).
Then the tuple {g′0,g
′
1,g
′
2, γ
′
1, γ
′
2} satisfies Equation (5) for the following choices:
g′0 = a33g0+a13g1+a23g2; g
′
1 = a31g0+a11g1+a21g2; g
′
2 = a32g0+a12g1+a22g2.
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Proof Substituting the values of γ1, γ2 in g0
[i] + γ1g1
[i] + γ2g2
[i] and rearranging
in the form (· · · )[i] + γ′1(· · · )
[i] + γ′2(· · · )
[i] leads to the assertion.
⊓⊔
It was further shown in [1] that the secret subspace parameter γ was the root of
a polynomial with constituent factors of the form: X [i] −X [j]. They established
that performing a standard semilinear transformation on any root yielded another
root - the projective linear group PGL(2, q) acts sharply transitively on the set of
roots. In this section, we produce a bivariate polynomial of which each root pair
is a tuple {γ1, γ2} that can similarly lead to a valid secret key.
5.1 The Polynomial Equation for {γ1, γ2}
We now use the extraction subspaces to set up a polynomial equation for the tuple
{γ1, γ2}. Owing to the structure of the underlying Gabidulin codes, we can choose
any element in 〈g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2〉 as a candidate for g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2. Moreover,
for distinct integers i, j, k in the range [1, n− k− 1], we can show that (cf. Lemma
5 in [1]) 〈g0,g1,g2〉 can be expressed as a direct sum as follows:
〈g0 + γ
[−i]
1 g1 + γ
[−i]
2 g2〉 ⊕ 〈g0 + γ
[−j]
1 g1 + γ
[−j]
2 g2〉 ⊕ 〈g0 + γ
[−k]
1 g1 + γ
[−k]
2 g2〉.
This implies that, given a choice of (i, j, k) there exists a unique triple (u,v,w)
such that: u+ v +w = g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2, where u = k1(g0 + γ
[−i]
1 g1 + γ
[−i]
2 g2),
v = k2(g0+ γ
[−j]
1 g1 + γ
[−j]
2 g2) and w = k3(g0+ γ
[−k]
1 g1+ γ
[−k]
2 g2), for ki ∈ Fqm .
Thus we have:
k1 + k2 + k3 = 1;
k1γ
[−i]
1 + k2γ
[−j]
1 + k3γ
[−k]
1 = γ1;
k1γ
[−i]
2 + k2γ
[−j]
2 + k3γ
[−k]
2 = γ2.
(6)
Solving the system of equations (6), we obtain:
k1 =
1
∆
[(γ1γ
[−j]
2 − γ2γ
[−j]
1 ) + (γ2γ
[−k]
1 − γ1γ
[−k]
2 ) + (γ
[−j]
1 γ
[−k]
2 − γ
[−k]
1 γ
[−j]
2 )];
k2 =
1
∆
[(γ1γ
[−k]
2 − γ2γ
[−k]
1 ) + (γ2γ
[−i]
1 − γ1γ
[−i]
2 ) + (γ
[−k]
1 γ
[−i]
2 − γ
[−i]
1 γ
[−k]
2 )];
k3 =
1
∆
[(γ1γ
[−i]
2 − γ2γ
[−i]
1 ) + (γ2γ
[−j]
1 − γ1γ
[−j]
2 ) + (γ
[−i]
1 γ
[−j]
2 − γ
[−j]
1 γ
[−i]
2 )];
(7)
where
∆ = (γ
[−i]
1 γ
[−j]
2 −γ
[−j]
1 γ
[−i]
2 )+(γ
[−k]
1 γ
[−i]
2 −γ
[−i]
1 γ
[−k]
2 )+(γ
[−j]
1 γ
[−k]
2 −γ
[−k]
1 γ
[−j]
2 ).
(8)
Denote the vector u obtained for the index set {i, j, k} as uijk. It is obvi-
ous that any pair (uijk,uij′k′ ) satisfies: uijk = αuij′k′ , for some α ∈ Fqm , since
uijk,uij′k′ ∈ 〈(g0+γ
[−i]
1 g1+γ
[−i]
2 g2)〉Fqm . As the coefficients ki in (6) are depen-
dent on i, j, k as well, we denote:
uijk = k
ijk
1 (g0 + γ
[−i]
1 g1 + γ
[−i]
2 g2).
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This leads to an equation in terms of the coefficients used to describe the vector
u as follows: kijk1 = αk
ij′k′
1 . Substituting the values of k1 for both sets of indices,
using Equations (7) and (8), we obtain a polynomial equation in γ1, γ2 over Fqm .
As an illustration, the corresponding equation for u123 and u145 is :
1
∆123
[(γ1γ
[−2]
2 − γ2γ
[−2]
1 ) + (γ2γ
[−3]
1 − γ1γ
[−3]
2 ) + (γ
[−2]
1 γ
[−3]
2 − γ
[−3]
1 γ
[−2]
2 )] =
α
1
∆145
[(γ1γ
[−4]
2 − γ2γ
[−4]
1 ) + (γ2γ
[−5]
1 − γ1γ
[−5]
2 ) + (γ
[−4]
1 γ
[−5]
2 − γ
[−5]
1 γ
[−4]
2 )]
(9)
where ∆1jk’s are obtained by similar substitutions in (8) and α ∈ F
∗
qm .
Raising both sides of (9) to q5 and rearranging the factors, we have a poly-
nomial equation in γ1, γ2. If we assign the pair of indeterminates X,Y to γ1, γ2
respectively, the resulting bi-variate equation has the form (for α ∈ F∗qm):
[(X [5]Y [3] −X [3]Y [5]) + (X [3]Y [2] −X [2]Y [3]) + (X [2]Y [5] −X [5]Y [2])]
× [(X [4]Y [1] −X [1]Y [4]) + (X [1]Y −XY [1]) + (XY [4] −X [4]Y )] =
α[(X [5]Y [1] −X [1]Y [5]) + (X [1]Y −XY [1]) + (X [5]Y −X [5]Y )]
× [(X [4]Y [3] −X [3]Y [4]) + (X [3]Y [2] −X [2]Y [3]) + (X [2]Y [4] −X [4]Y [2])]. (10)
To obtain alternative candidates for the original pair (γ1, γ2), therefore, we will
examine the set of roots of a modified version of the above equation.
5.2 Linear group action on the set of roots
Recall that in [1], the parameter γ ∈ Fqm \ Fq, which spans the secret subspace
V = 〈(1, γ)〉, is a root of a polynomial Pγ(X) =
1
(Xq−X)q+1Qγ(X), where Qγ(X)
has terms which are products of the form: A(X) = Xq
i
−Xq
j
. We term Pγ(X) as
the reduced polynomial for the case λ = 2, as this was obtained by removing all
the linear factors over Fq, with multiplicities, from Qγ(X). As formulated in [1],
a valid alternative γ′ is obtained by the following map:
PGL(2, q)× P(1, q)→ P(1, q);
((
a c
b d
)
, [γ : 1]
)
7→
[
aγ + b
cγ + d
: 1
]
(11)
where ad − bc 6= 0. As shown in (11), this map can be interpreted as the action
of the projective linear group PGL(2, q) on the projective space P(1, q), and any
γ′ = aγ+b
cγ+d may be chosen for γ. Further, (cf. Lemma 6 and Proposition 5 in [1])
the transformation γ 7→ aγ+b
cγ+d fixes the roots of A(X) = 0. As γ ∈ Fqm \ Fq, this
implies that the set of roots of Pγ(X) = 0 is fixed as well. This leads to the con-
clusion that any root of Pγ(X) is a valid choice for the parameter γ.
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It is evident that the above action is a collineation in two variables x1, x2, rep-
resenting the general basis elements of a 2-dimensional V , which leads to a lin-
ear fractional transformation of the ratio γ = x1
x2
. In the 3-dimensional case, we
consider a collineation in three variables x1, x2, x3, leading to a linear fractional
transformation on the 2 ratios: γ1 =
x1
x3
and γ2 =
x2
x3
given by:
γ′1 =
a11γ1 + a12γ2 + a13
a31γ1 + a32γ2 + a33
; γ′2 =
a21γ1 + a22γ2 + a23
a31γ1 + a32γ2 + a33
. (12)
Similar to the defining map in (11), the coefficients in (12) form a 3×3 matrix
A = (aij) over Fq, with non-zero determinant.
One observes that the polynomial equation in (10), having (γ1, γ2) as a root pair,
is constituted of factors of the following form:
f (ijk)(X,Y ) := (X [i]Y [j]−X [j]Y [i])+(X [k]Y [i]−X [i]Y [k])+(X [j]Y [k]−X [k]Y [j])
(13)
It is required that the action induced by the ‘collineation matrix’ A should fix the
set of roots of the polynomial of the form given in (10): a way to achieve that is
to fix the set of roots of any term having the form given in (13). To that end we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under the transformations
X 7→
a11X + a12Y + a13
a31X + a32Y + a33
; Y 7→
a21X + a22Y + a23
a31X + a32Y + a33
; aij ∈ Fq,
a polynomial f (ijk)(X,Y ) as given in Equation (13) is transformed to:
∆A
(a31X + a32Y + a33)[i]+[j]+[k]
f (ijk)(X,Y ) (14)
where ∆A is the determinant of A = (aij), a 3× 3 matrix over Fq.
Proof Under the transformations, all the terms of the following forms have zero
coefficient.
1. X [i]+[j]+[k], Y [i]+[j]+[k];
2. X [a]+[b]Y [c], Y [a]+[b]X [c], where (a, b, c) are permutations of (i, j, k);
3. X [a], Y [b], where a and b run over i, j, k.
The non-zero terms may be grouped as:
(X [i]Y [j] −X [j]Y [i]), (X [k]Y [i] −X [i]Y [k]) and (X [j]Y [k] −X [k]Y [j]),
each with coefficient:
∆A
(a31X + a32Y + a33)[i]+[j]+[k]
.
⊓⊔
It is evident from (10) that the polynomial equation F(X,Y ) satisfied by
(γ1, γ2) is of the following form:
F(X,Y ) = f (i1j1k1)(X,Y )f (i2j2k2)(X,Y )− αf (i1j2k2)(X,Y )f (i2j1k1)(X,Y ) (15)
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where il > jl > kl; l = 1, 2, with i1 ≥ i2, the two sets of (i, j, k)-indices being
distinct, and α ∈ F∗qm .
From Lemma 2, it follows that, under the stated transformations,
F(X,Y ) 7−→
∆2A
(a31X + a32Y + a33)Σ
F(X,Y ) (16)
where Σ := [i1] + [j1] + [k1] + [i2] + [j2] + [k2].
For any pair (γ1, γ2) such that V = 〈1, γ1, γ2〉 is a 3-dimensional vector space
over Fq, we have: (a31γ1+a32γ2+a33) 6= 0 when the aij ’s from Fq are not all zero.
As any root pair of F(X,Y ) sends [∆2A/(a31X + a32Y + a33)
Σ]F(X,Y ) to zero,
the semilinear transformation on the two original basis elements {γ1, γ2} produces
another pair of basis elements which satisfies the same equation F(X,Y ). In the
2-dimensional case, the action of PGL(2, q) is sharply transitive on the points of
PG(1, q). Hence one could conclude that all the roots of the reduced polynomial
Pγ(X) for the single parameter γ belonged to the single orbit of the action. In the
3-dimensional case, we have established that the action of PGL(3, q) on the points
of PG(2, q) indeed maps one root of the initial polynomial F(X,Y ) to another. We
next construct a counterpart of the reduced polynomial Pγ(X) that is analogously
obtained from F(X,Y ).
5.3 The reduced polynomial for λ = 3
We first analyze the construction of the reduced polynomial Pγ(X) in the 2-
dimensional case. To that end we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Denote the polynomial Qγ(X) as Qγ(X) = f1(X) − α
q3f2(X)
where f1(X) := (X
q3 −Xq)(Xq
2
−X) and f2(X) := (X
q3 −X)(Xq
2
−Xq) and
α ∈ F∗qm . Then
Pγ(X) =
Qγ(X)
gcd(f1(X), f2(X))
Proof As (Xq
3
−Xq) = (Xq
2
−X)q, the roots of f1 are the elements of Fq2 , each
counted with multiplicity q + 1.
Further, (Xq
3
−X) is the defining equation of Fq3 and (X
q2 −Xq) = (Xq −X)q.
Thus the roots of f2 are the elements of Fq3 and the elements of Fq, the latter
counted with multiplicity q. As Fq3 ∩ Fq2 = Fq, it follows that
gcd(f1(X), f2(X)) = (X
q −X)q+1. (17)
⊓⊔
We next attempt a similar reduction of the initial polynomial F(X,Y ), by first
identifying the constituent polynomials as follows.
F(X,Y ) = f1(X,Y )f2(X,Y )− αf3(X,Y )f4(X,Y )
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where
f1(X,Y ) = [(X
[5]Y [3]−X [3]Y [5])+(X [3]Y [2]−X [2]Y [3])+(X [2]Y [5]−X [5]Y [2])]
f2(X,Y ) = [(X
[4]Y [1] −X [1]Y [4]) + (X [1]Y −XY [1]) + (XY [4] −X [4]Y )]
f3(X,Y ) = [(X
[5]Y [1] −X [1]Y [5]) + (X [1]Y −XY [1]) + (X [5]Y −X [5]Y )]
f4(X,Y ) = [(X
[4]Y [3]−X [3]Y [4])+(X [3]Y [2]−X [2]Y [3])+(X [2]Y [4]−X [4]Y [2])].
(18)
In order to reduce the initial polynomial, we will prove the following theorem on
the existence of a common factor based on subsequent lemmas.
Theorem 5 The initial polynomial F(X,Y ) has a factor of the following form:

 ∏
a∈Fq
(X + a)
∏
b,c∈Fq
(bX + Y + c)


q2+1
(19)
The first lemma towards proving the theorem deals with the polynomials f2(X,Y )
and f3(X,Y ).
Lemma 3 The polynomials f2(X,Y ) and f3(X,Y ) are divisible by
f0(X,Y ) =
∏
a∈Fq
(X + a)
∏
b,c∈Fq
(bX + Y + c)
Proof Examining the zeroes of the linear polynomials, it is readily established that
every factor of the form X+a, a ∈ Fq, or bX+Y +c, b, c ∈ Fq, divides each of the
polynomials: f2(X,Y ) and f3(X,Y ). Both the X-degree and Y -degree of f0(X,Y )
equal q2, while those for f2 and f3 are q
4 and q5, respectively. The total degree of
f0 is q + q(q − 1) + q = q
2 + q, which is again less than q4 + q for f2 and q
5 + q
for f3. Hence the lemma.
⊓⊔
Next we examine the polynomial f4(X,Y ) and prove that it divides f5(X,Y ).
Lemma 4 The polynomial f4(X,Y ) = −[f0(X,Y )]
q2 where f0(X,Y ) is the prod-
uct of linear factors as defined in Lemma 3.
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Proof Clearly
∏
a∈Fq
(X + a) = Xq −X.
We further have:∏
b,c∈Fq
(bX + Y + c) =
∏
b∈Fq
∏
c∈Fq
((bX + Y ) + c)
=
∏
b∈Fq
((bX + Y )q − (bX + Y ))
=
∏
b∈Fq
((Y q − Y ) + b(Xq −X))
= (Xq −X)q
∏
b∈Fq
(Z + b), Z :=
Y q − Y
Xq −X
= (Xq −X)q(Zq − Z)
= ((Y q − Y )q − (Xq −X)q−1(Y q − Y ))
= ((Y q
2
− Y q)− (Xq −X)q−1(Y q − Y )).
Thus it follows that:
f0(X,Y ) = (X
q −X)((Y q
2
− Y q)− (Xq −X)q−1(Y q − Y ))
= ((Y q
2
− Y q)(Xq −X)− (Xq
2
−Xq)(Y q − Y )).
Therefore, raising to the q2-th power, we obtain:
[f0(X,Y )]
q2 = [(Y q
2
− Y q)(Xq −X)− (Xq
2
−Xq)(Y q − Y )]q
2
= [Y q
2
Xq −Xq
2
Y q + Y qX −XqY + Y Xq
2
− Y q
2
X]q
2
= −[X [4]Y [3] −X [3]Y [4] +X [3]Y [2] −X [2]Y [3] +X [2]Y [4] −X [4]Y [2]]
= −f4(X,Y )
⊓⊔
Lemma 5 The polynomial f4(X,Y ) divides f1(X,Y ); consequently f1 contains
all the factors of f0(X,Y ) with multiplicity at least q
2.
Proof The polynomial f1(X,Y ) can be rewritten in the following form:
f1(X,Y ) = −[(Y
q3 − Y q)(Xq −X)− (Xq
3
−Xq)(Y q − Y )]q
2
Clearly
∏
a∈Fq
(X + a) = Xq −X is a factor of the polynomial within the brackets
on the r.h.s.
It can be shown that any pair (x, y) ∈ Fq ×Fq, which is a zero of any linear factor
of the form bX + Y + c, b, c ∈ Fq, is a zero of the bracketed polynomial as well.
Taking into account the degree of the bracketed polynomial, one can conclude that
[f0(X,Y )]
q2 divides f1(X,Y ).
The assertions then follow from Lemma 4 .
⊓⊔
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Proof of Theorem 5:
It follows from the preceding lemmas that both the terms f1(X,Y )f2(X,Y ) and
f3(X,Y )f4(X,Y ) contain [f0(X,Y )]
q2+1 as a factor where
f0(X,Y ) =
∏
a∈Fq
(X + a)
∏
b,c∈Fq
(bX + Y + c)
This proves the theorem.

In view of Theorem 5, we define the reduced polynomial Pr(X,Y ) for our case
as follows.
Definition 1 The reduced polynomial for λ = 3 is defined by:
Pr(X,Y ) =
F(X,Y )[∏
a∈Fq
(X + a)
∏
b,c∈Fq
(bX + Y + c)
]q2+1 (20)
Before moving on to the final steps of key-recovery for λ = 3, we present a
brief comparison of the reduced polynomials Pγ(X) and Pr(X,Y ) in the form of
a few observations as follows.
1. The reduced polynomial Pγ(X), for the case λ = 2, was obtained in [1] from
the initial polynomial Qγ(X) by dividing out the factor (X
q −X)q+1. This is
equivalent to factoring out all distinct linear polynomials over Fq, each with
multiplicity q + 1. The polynomial Pr(X,Y ) is obtained as the result of an
analogous reduction on the initial polynomial F(X,Y ) by factoring out all the
distinct linear polynomials in X,Y over Fq, each with multiplicity q
2 + 1 (cf.
Theorem 5).
2. The degree of Pγ(X) matches exactly with the cardinality of PGL(2, q). How-
ever, for λ = 3, the total degree of F(X,Y ) is q5 + q4 + q3 + q, which is
reduced by (q2 + q)(q2 + 1) = q4 + q3 + q2 + q to yield q5 − q2. In this
case, the total degree of the reduced polynomial does not equal but divides
|PGL(3, q)| = q8 − q6 − q5 + q3.
3. The reduction factor in the case λ = 2 was precisely the gcd of the two additive
components of the initial polynomialQγ(X). In dealing with F(X,Y ), one pos-
sible way of reduction would have been to use a Gro¨bner basis of the ideal gen-
erated by the additive components f1(X,Y )f2(X,Y ) and f3(X,Y )f4(X,Y ).
Instead we have extracted a common factor and proceeded to reduce F(X,Y )
with it. But our simulations for small field sizes using Sage ([11]) suggest that
this factor is indeed the greatest common divisor over Fq of the additive com-
ponents in the sense of polynomial factorization ( cf. for instance, [6]). So we
have the following
Conjecture:
The polynomials f1(X,Y )f2(X,Y ) and f3(X,Y )f4(X,Y ) in Fq[X,Y ] have a
greatest common factor given by [f0(X,Y )]
q2+1 .
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5.4 Completion of Key-recovery
We begin outlining the final steps of the key-recovery by first examining the action
of PGL(3, q) on the roots of the reduced polynomial Pr(X,Y ) defined in (20).
In particular, we consider the action on the defining root pair (γ1, γ2) such that
γ1, γ2 ∈ Fqm\Fq, with dimFq〈1, γ1, γ2〉 = 3, are used to define the initial polynomial
F(X,Y ) (cf. Subsection 5.2).
Proposition 3 Let (γ1, γ2) be the defining root pair of Pr(X,Y ). Then the fol-
lowing action of PGL(3, q) as defined in Lemma 2, specified by the matrix A =
(aij) ∈ GL3(Fq), maps (γ1, γ2) to another root of Pr(X,Y ):
γ1 7→
a11γ1 + a12γ2 + a13
a31γ1 + a32γ2 + a33
; γ2 7→
a21γ1 + a22γ2 + a23
a31γ1 + a32γ2 + a33
.
Proof Enough to prove that the pair (γ′1, γ
′
2), defined as follows, is a root.
γ′1 =
a11γ1 + a12γ2 + a13
a31γ1 + a32γ2 + a33
; γ′2 =
a21γ1 + a22γ2 + a23
a31γ1 + a32γ2 + a33
.
We have: Pr(X,Y ) = F(X,Y )/G(X,Y ), with (cf. Lemma 4)
G(X,Y ) = [f0(X,Y )]
q2+1 = f(X,Y )f4(X,Y ) (21)
where
f(X,Y ) = [Xq
2
Y q −XqY q
2
+XqY −XY q +XY q
2
−Xq
2
Y ];
f4(X,Y ) = [X
[4]Y [3] −X [3]Y [4] +X [3]Y [2] −X [2]Y [3] +X [2]Y [4] −X [4]Y [2]].
If we perform the given transformations substituting X for γ1 and Y for γ2, then
the application of Lemma 2 yields:
f(X,Y ) 7−→
∆A
(a31X + a32Y + a33)q
2+q+1
f(X,Y );
f4(X,Y ) 7−→
∆A
(a31X + a32Y + a33)q
4+q3+q2
f4(X,Y );
F(X,Y ) 7−→
∆2A
(a31X + a32Y + a33)q
5+q4+q3+q2+q+1
F(X,Y )
Hence, under the transformations,
Pr(X,Y ) 7−→
1
(a31X + a32Y + a33)q
5−q2
F(X,Y )
f(X,Y )f4(X,Y )
=
1
(a31X + a32Y + a33)q
5−q2
Pr(X,Y ).
(22)
Reverting to γ1, γ2 we, therefore, have:
Pr(γ
′
1, γ
′
2) =
1
(a31γ1 + a32γ2 + a33)q
5−q2
Pr(γ1, γ2).
Given that (a31γ1+ a32γ2+ a33) 6= 0 from the definition of γ1, γ2, the proposition
follows.
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The above result indicates that we could proceed with a root pair, say (γ′1, γ
′
2),
of the polynomial Pr(X,Y ) to extract the tuple {g
′
0,g
′
1,g
′
2, γ
′
1, γ
′
2} for key-recovery.
For the sake of completeness, we briefly outline the key steps in the Coggia-
Couvreur attack for λ = 3 as follows.
1. Relating g′0,g
′
1,g
′
2 to known parameters: Let
γ1 =
b11γ
′
1 + b12γ
′
2 + b13
b31γ′1 + b32γ
′
2 + b33
; γ2 =
b21γ
′
1 + b22γ
′
2 + b23
b31γ′1 + b32γ
′
2 + b33
.
for some B = (bij) ∈ GL3(Fq).
Then we can obtain expressions for g′0,g
′
1,g
′
2 in terms of g0,g1,g2 and γ
′
1, γ
′
2
in the manner of Proposition 1, from the equation:
g′0 + γ
′
1g
′
1 + γ
′
2g
′
2 = g0 + γ1g1 + γ2g2.
2. Solving for g′0,g
′
1,g
′
2: The quantities u123,v123 defined in Subsection 5.1, are
used to compute (g′0+γ
′[−1]
1 g
′
1+γ
′[−1]
2 g
′
2) and (g
′
0+γ
′[−2]
1 g
′
1+γ
′[−2]
2 g
′
2) (vide
Lemma 2). Using, in addition, the known vector g′0 + γ
′
1g
′
1 + γ
′
2g
′
2, we can
extract g′0,g
′
1,g
′
2.
3. The previous steps outline the recovery of an alternate key in the form of
the tuple {g′0, g
′
1,g
′
2, γ
′
1, γ
′
2}. Using this alternate key in the formulation of
Subsection 3.1, we can compute the dual C⊥pub in a similar manner as presented
in [1], and hence, decrypt the ciphertext.
6 Conclusion
We have extended the key-recovery attack on Loidreau’s rank-metric scheme,
which was proposed by Coggia and Couvreur and proven for dimension parameter
λ = 2 , to cases with λ > 2. Specifically, we have detailed the steps to identify
the non-random structure (the so-called “distinguisher”) of the dual of the public
code, denoted C⊥pub, for all values of λ ≥ 3. Further, we have extended the key-
recovery attack to λ = 3.
This expands a successful attack on Loidreau’s scheme when the underlying code
rate is ≥ 1 − 1
λ
. It will be worthwhile to attempt a modification of the attack
to work for lower rate codes as well, especially for increasing values of λ. In an-
other direction, Loidreau’s rank-metric scheme claims resistance to Overbeck-type
attacks, among a few other proposals. It is certainly of interest to revisit the formu-
lation of “distinguishers” and key-recovery attacks on the other Overbeck-resistant
rank-metric schemes in the light of this success against Loidreau’s scheme.
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